Introduction
Despite information systems (IS) outsourcing has a long history, many global outsourcing projects fail to achieve estimated goals (e. g. cost reduction). One reason for this may be the failure of choosing adequate governance mechanismsas governance costs are often higher than initially estimated (Dibbern et al. 2008) . Governance mechanisms are are mainly represented by contractual governance and relational governance, which are two main determinants for IS outsourcing success (Lacity et al. 2009 ).
From a managerial point of view, the question arises as to how contractual and relational governance should be combined. To address this question it is, first of all, important to understand how contractual and relational governance relate to each other. In recent years scholars have discussed the relationship of contractual and relational governance in IS outsourcing. For a long time the substitutional view of governance mechanisms was dominant, predicting that complex contracts are an opposing alternative to unwritten agreements based on trust (MaCaulay 1963) . Empirical results, however, challenged this view and rather supported the competing perspective, implying that relational and contractual governance are complements (Poppo et al. 2002; Goo et al. 2009 ). However, results of novel investigations (Woolthuis et al. 2005; Mellewigt et al. 2007 ; Tiwana forthcoming) favour another argument: Relational and contractual governance mechanisms can simultaneously be complements and substitutes.
Given these inconsistencies the following research question arises: Is the relationship between governance mechanisms (substitutes or complements) the outcome of distinct processes of interaction between contractual and relational governance?
By addressing this question, we close a current research gap and create a basic understanding on how contractual and relational governance become complements or substitutes. For that purpose, interactions of governance mechanisms were analyzed in a multiple case-study and typical patterns of interaction were summarized in archetypes.
Literature Analysis

Contractual and Relational Governance
An outsourcing contract is a central component of each outsourcing engagement to manage the relationship between client and vendor. Usually this kind of contract contains overall objectives of the partnership as well as certain obligations for both client and vendor. Several contractual elements which are likely to appear in a contract are service levels or other performance indicators as well as corresponding measurement methodologies (Goo et al. 2009 ). These written obligations build the formal contract. The management based on this formal contract can be understood as contractual governance. In other words, contractual governance is "the use of a formalized, legally-binding agreement or a contract to govern the interfirm partnership" (Lee et al. 2006, p. 898) .
In contrast to contractual governance the mechanisms underlying relational governance are usually unwritten (Lacity et al. 2009 ). It builds on the ability of social processes to enforce obligations, promises and expectations (Poppo et al. 2002) . Relational norms on the one hand form the basis for relational governance and are on the other hand reinforced by its application. In this context former research has identified trust and commitment as the two most important relational norms (Goo et al. 2009 ). Therefore a well-attuned relational governance is indicated through high levels of trust and commitment and manifests in informal adjustments between client and vendor employees (e.g. in meetings or phone calls), informal information sharing and open communication (Poppo et al. 2002; Goo et al. 2009; Lacity et al. 2009 ). In the following, we refer to contractual governance in the sense of formal mechanisms and equate relational governance with informal mechanisms.
Complementarity versus Substitution between Contractual and Relational Governance
From a theoretical viewpoint there are two major perspectives on the relationship of contractual and relational governance: the complementary and the substitutional view. Referring to the concepts of dualism and duality
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The substitutional view characterizes contractual and relational governance as dualism, meaning that contractual and relational mechanisms are separate concepts that differ in terms of their base (power vs. shared values) as well as in their mechanism to align conflicting goals (suppression vs. consensus) (Reed 2001) . Characterization of contractual and relational governance as dualism also manifests in their differential modes of affecting human action. Contractual governance is part of an impersonal social structure determining human behavior, while elements of relational governance, such as trustful behavior, are the product of human agency, i.e. of free will (Möllering 2005) . This conceptualization of contractual and relational governance as dualism radiates on their relationship: contractual and relational are seen as substitutes implying that contractual governance is detrimental for relational governance, while relational governance reduces the need for contractual regulations (Bachmann 2001) . As an example the substitutional view argues that in situations of weak relational norms complex contracts are needed to mitigate opportunism, while in situations of a good relationship opportunism is less likely to occur and thus contracts are seen as unnecessary or at worst counter-productive (Poppo et al. 2002) .
, this section points out their major differences and traces them back to the agency-structure problem.
The complementary view characterizes contractual and relational governance as duality, hence it rejects their conceptual separation and therefore rather points to their similarities and mutual dependency. Consequently, the former separation of contractual and relational governance is removed in favour of an emphasis on their functional equivalence, as they are seen as "equivalent functional alternatives which simultaneously and parallel to each other absorb uncertainty and reduce complexity" (Reed 2001, p. 204) . This is not a marginal issue, because it implies that anticipation of an actor's behaviour is not based on either structure (contractual) or agency (relational), but on both at the same time. Consequence of this dualistic conceptualization is the complementary relationship between contractual and relational governance. It purports that contractual and relational elements enable each other and that the level of control exercised through contractual agreements positively affects relational norms and vice versa (Möllering 2005) . As an example complementary view argues that precise contractual stipulations might foster trust by creating reliable mutual expectations.
Given these conflicting views, the question arises, which of the views has experienced stronger empirical support. While Poppo and Zenger (2002) found evidence for a complementary relationship, other studies substantiate the substitutional view (Larson 1992; Ring et al. 1994) . Moreover, recent studies found out that relational and contractual governance are both substitutes and complements (Woolthuis et al. 2005 ; Tiwana forthcoming).
Hence, theoretical as well as empirical findings draw a contradictory picture on the relationship between contractual and relational governance. On the one hand theory suggests either a purely substitutional or complementary view. On the other hand empirical findings do not clearly support one of the competing views, latest evidence rather supports the more complex view that governance mechanisms can simultaneously be complements and substitutes. However, if governance mechanisms can be both substitutes and complements, we are in need for a still missing basic understanding on how governance mechanisms become complements or substitutes. To address this research gap, we formulate our research question as follows: Is the relationship between governance mechanisms (substitutes or complements) the outcome of distinct processes of interaction between contractual and relational governance?
Research Design
Methodology
An exploratory, multiple case study approach was chosen, because it seemed to be particularly appropriate, as our study strives for answering a "how" question (Miles et al. 1994) , and it deals with "operational links needing to be traced over time" (Yin 2003, p. 6) . Furthermore, the events that need to be linked defy control by the researcher and they are rather contemporary than part of the "dead" past (Yin 2003) . Since this study is concerned with the exploration of interaction processes between contractual and relational governance in IS outsourcing arrangements, the unit of analysis is the relationship between client and vendor. To allow for generalization, we followed replication logic and conducted five case studies in the German financial services industry. The exploratory nature of this study implies that the processes and relationships would have been difficult to access in a quantitative manner; therefore, we rely on qualitative data to gain an in-depth understanding of the interaction processes described above. This data was mainly gathered in semi-structured interviews but, to improve validity of our findings (Benbasat et al. 1987) , we complemented them with a content analysis of contracts.
Data Collection and Analysis
To stay in line with the research objectives and the multiple case study design we pursued a purposeful sampling strategy (Eisenhardt 1989; Patton 2002) . Striving for literal replication, we chose similar cases; for which we expected similar results (Yin 2003) . Consequently each case was required to fulfil the following criteria: 1) only projects with approximately the same size delivered by vendors of approximately the same size and 2) only outsourcing projects with a minimum duration of six months. The first criteria was chosen to improve comparability of the findings, because it is an important antecedent for the choice of governance mechanisms (Van de Ven et al. 1976; Kirsch 1997) . A minimum duration was chosen because the literature suggests that substitutional and complementary effects of governance mechanisms unfold over a specific period of time (Inkpen et al. 2004 ). The value of six months was decided on because Larson (1992) reckons this as the minimum amount of time for partners in inter-organizational relationships to perceive each other as trustworthy, which is seen as a major prerequisite for relational governance. To control for potential bias of organizational (Hofstede 1991) and departmental culture (Wilkins et al. 1983) , we chose the same department of a single-client organization for all outsourcing relationships -the HR department of a German-based financial services provider (GLOBAL BANK).
A total number of 19 interviews was conducted. To reflect the unit of analysis in data collection, each analyzed relationship consisted of at least two expert interviews: A client employee involved in managing the partnership with the vendor and a respective counterpart from the vendor. On the client side, experts at the senior and operational levels were interviewed. This allowed us to capture interactions between relational and contractual governance mechanisms on different levels of the hierarchy. The interviews were held either face-to-face or by telephone. All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. In sum, the interview protocols resulted in more than 91,500 words of qualitative data.
Data analysis involved that each document and interview was carefully interpreted by the first and second author to explore how contractual and relational governance mechanisms interact. This interpretation of the data consisted of three steps: First, data was scanned to identify interaction processes between relational and contractual governance. Second, the identified fragment was coded according to the two potential outcomes of the interaction process as "complementarity process" or "substitutional process". Subsequently, the two coders re-examined potentially ambiguous fragments and reached a consensus on their interpretation. In a third step, we analyzed every single "complementarity" and "substitutional" process in terms of similarities and differences in practices, cognitive processes and perceptions of the actors. The outcome of this third step was four archetypical processes, which explain how contractual and relational governance interact to become either complements or substitutes. In the next section, we develop these archetypes by analyzing case data. 
Results
Archetype 1 -Contractual Governance as Enabler for Relational Governance
The first pattern of interaction between contractual and relational governance is characterized by contract-based mechanisms that lead to relational governance by prescribing social interaction. Hence, this pattern describes a complementary relationship. To illustrate this archetype the PAYROLL case is well-suited. After taking over the services from a former vendor in 2009, currently DELTA is the provider in this business process outsourcing (BPO) relationship. After a relatively short time of collaboration, GLOBAL BANK and DELTA were satisfied with the relationship and arrived at a well-attuned relational governance. This manifested in an open information exchange and a lot of informal ad-hoc communication via telephone and email. Interestingly, many hints point into the direction that the contract has built the basis for this open and trustful communication as it contains schedules, which specify regular meetings. These formal meetings seem to have advanced the formation of the above described relational elements. Interviewee C5 supports this conclusion, when he describes that as a result of the "formal governance" meetings an additional "continuous communication flow" has developed. Apparently the contractually prescribed social interaction (in the formal "governance meeting") has laid the foundation to utilize relational governance subsequently.
The other cases show similar interrelations between contractual and relational governance: Contractually prescribed meetings enforce social interaction, which in turn promotes the evolution of informal governance mechanisms. C7 in the GRAD RECRUIT case explains that they started with "weekly calls" in the beginning of the relationship, which were specified within the contract. Advanced by these weekly calls additional calls on a voluntary basis developed. A similar effect was reported on vendor-side. V2 describes that based on the scheduled weekly call, they coordinate further calls and meetings if necessary:
"During the weekly call we might decide that we need to have a meeting so we schedule that during the call. There is nothing kind of systematically [for these additional meetings] in place".
Obviously, contractually specified meetings may build the basis for social exchange between client and vendor. Within this social interaction, mutual trust and shared norms among the employees can evolve. As a consequence, informal calls and meetings are agreed what reflects relational governance. Hence, contractual governance strongly supports the evolution of relational governance, but at the end both governance mechanisms seem to be equally important.
V3 in the HR OPS case explains how a transition manager who was involved in contract preparation went onshore to train the vendor team. The transition manager focused on the adherence of contractually defined meetings as well as on the formation of a shared understanding regarding relational norms and expectations. Hence, this training stirred up social interaction and as a consequence informal dayto-day interactions evolved to a confirmed habit. Apparently, contractually prescribed training, stimulated the development of relational governance.
In the GRAD RECRUIT case another effect is visible. There were some problems during the roll out in the Asia-Pacific region. An "efficient communication structure" (V5) was not in place, what was referred to as the main problem, leading to a situation which was mainly characterized by "act and react" (V5) and not by an open and trustful communication. Hence, the missing communication structure reflects a lack of contractual governance. As a consequence, social exchange was not promoted and this resulted in a poor relational governance. Subsequently, a tight communication structure was established. The impact of bringing structure into the communication process was significant: Hence, contractual governance mechanisms , such as regular meetings and calls, are an important driver to form relational governance, as they foster social interaction. In turn, this social exchange leads to shared norms and expectations as well as mutual trust, which again promotes continuous informal communication and information exchange. Having these facts in mind, we conclude that there is a regular pattern of interaction between contractual and relational governance, and which can be described as the archetype: "contractual governance as enabler for relational governance".
Archetype 2 -Relational Governance as Enabler for Contractual Completeness
We discovered another pattern, in which a well-attuned relational governance is the prerequisite for the refinement of an existing contract. Hence, this archetype describes how relational governance complements contractual governance.
In the GRAD-RECRUIT case the vendor BETA is bound by a contract to provide defined software functionalities as a web application, supporting GLOBAL BANK's graduate recruiting processes. Nevertheless, from time to time GLOBAL BANK's recruiters expect the vendor to deliver software functionalities that are "not part of the contract" (C7). In this case a requirements analysis procedure is initiated that is: Requirements are elicited, negotiated and specified by means of relational governance. As an example, to determine "what they [the recruiters] want" (V2) vendor's software developers and client's recruiters are "discussing" (V2) these issues informally "on the phone" (V2). Interestingly, this drawing on relational mechanisms does not happen accidentally, but rather to expressly bypass a contractually defined change request process. The reason for this is that the formally specified change request process is not considered to be adequate for the complex task of establishing a shared understanding concerning the requirements. Vital for the demonstration of the interplay between contractual and relational governance is the outcome of this relational coordination process: A mutually agreed upon proposal describing the extended software functionalities. This proposal subsequently became an "addendum to the contract" (C7).
This pattern of interaction between relational and contractual governance is replicated in the PAY-ROLL case. The contracting parties have agreed upon an elaborate contract, defining among other things, which services the vendor is obliged to perform and what goals he is expected to achieve. However, in the beginning of the relationship the contract was indeterminate on how to fulfil contractual obligations. To bridge this gap the vendor and GLOBAL BANK started a process of intense mutual adjustments leading to a so called "Note of Understanding", expressing how the payroll services should be performed. In the process of mutual adjustments the parties made extensive use of relational mechanisms, such as informal "phone calls" (C5) and close personal interaction. Again, vital for the demonstration of the interplay between contractual and relational governance is, what happened subsequently: The "Note of Understanding" gets "signed off" (C5) and therefore becomes part of the contract and hence refines it.
While the preceding examples pointed out how well-attuned relational governance enables the parties to refine the contract we also observed the reverse effect: In the RECRUIT case the client complains about the quality of the contract, specifically that "the SLAs were not as good as they ... should have been" (C11), because there was an insufficient "understanding [of] the technology and what really could be in [a] SLA related to it" (C11). Interestingly, the cause for this undesired incompleteness of the contract is explicitly traced back to deficits in relational governance:
"We never really got to the stage that the relationship was such that we … could be consulted of about that issues." (V5).
Thus, in this case a poor relational governance was the cause of an undesired incomplete contract.
Summing up, a good relational governance complements contractual governance by means of laying the foundation for a refinement of the contract. It seems that relational governance and the strong social ties associated with it give access to knowledge which would otherwise be hard to collect (Nonaka et al. 2009 ) and which is subsequently used to refine contractual clauses. This observation differs from the widely accepted view that relational aspects, such as mutual trust, facilitate initial contract negotiations because trusting parties are more willing to compromise (e.g. Kale et al. 2000) . Our observations show that relational governance is not merely a remedy for a deficient willingness, but for a deficient (initial) capability to contract sufficiently complete. Therefore, we call this archetype "relational governance as enabler for contractual completeness".
Archetype 3 -Contractual Governance as Safety Net
While one type of governance mechanism directly stimulates the occurrence of the other in the first two archetypes presented here, a more indirect situation came apparent. The awareness of a contract mitigates the perceived relational risk. As a consequence, relational governance can develop freely. Hence, contractual governance complements relational governance. To illustrate this archetype, we first point to a apparently paradoxical situation: On the one hand the majority of interviewees emphasized the high importance of the contract. On the other hand even the very same interviewees noted that they would be aware of the existence of the contract, but that they do not know its content. The following case examples will point out how this seemingly paradoxical situation is resolved by means of the mentioned indirect interaction.
In the GRAD RECRUIT case a so called operational level agreement (OLA) was attached to the outsourcing contract. Comparable to service level agreements (SLAs), OLAs describe procedural matters, which are important for the day-to-day business within various technical domains. Although put in place to structure day-to-day interaction, as an attachment to the contract the OLA by definition represents contractual governance. Now interesting is the role and relevance the OLA takes on in the dayto-day management, as expressed by C6:
"before acting, I won't have a look into the OLA, this would be too time-consuming. Knowing the basic conditions of the OLA is enough to deal with everyday occurrences"
This quote shows that the OLA does not structure everyday business in detail. In fact quite the opposite is true, relational governance comes to the fore and the OLA backs out. As an example interviewees describe everyday interaction as driven by a behaviour, based on a general understanding of the contract, common sense, shared norms and expectations. However, the relationship between contractual and relational governance can not be described as a substitution, because the contract is obviously not replaced by relational governance instead it still seems to play an important role. This role is neither prescribing guidelines for day-to-day business nor is it directly fertilizing relational governance (like described in A1). The important fact is the awareness that there is a contract to appeal to in case of necessity, and this awareness gives employees a sense of security, as it mitigates the perceived risk of misconduct. This role of the contract is characterized by C6 as follows:
"[the OLA] finally defines the day-to-day business, respectively the collaboration on this level. It's a guidance. Exactly for that purpose we have an OLA. … As long as a collaboration based on partnership via phone and email works, it is a nice thing and if it does not work that well, it is something what acts supporting, as something to rely on".
In this quote, the need for a contract (OLA) in cases of trouble becomes obvious. Each employee can "rely on" the OLA if something "does not work that well".
Furthermore, this indirect interaction between contractual and relational governance also manifests in the reverse direction: Disbelieve in the protecting role of the contract and distrust within the relationship are intertwined. In the RECRUIT case, the application owner on client-side (C13), delivers evidence for this interaction. She explains that she is not aware of whether the vendor has received and acknowledged distinct security policies and whether they are part of the contract. As a consequence, she is not able to rely on the contract. Interestingly, the relationship between client and vendor in this case is characterized by distrust -indicating a poor relational governance.
The interaction between contractual and relational governance described in this section can be illustrated with a metaphor of a tightrope artist who is reassured in the presence of a safety net and can thus perform free of fear. Transferred to the context of contractual and relational governance, it seems that a contract may take the role of a safety net. That is, individuals know that there is something to rely on ifthe other contracting party does not act as agreed and expected. The contract complements relational governance by enabling it to develop freely, as the perceived relational risk is reduced. This is very similar to the safety net of the tightrope artist that enables him to dare extraordinary artistic feats. Hence, the contract complements relational governance
The safeguarding role of the contract also explains how the above mentioned paradox is resolved: The content of the contract does not have to be known to unfold a high importance in day-to-day interaction, because a rather general awareness of the existence of relevant contractual stipulations often seems to be sufficient for the contract to take a safeguarding role. Therefore, we call this archetype "contractual governance as safety net".
Archetype 4 -Relational Governance as Amplifier for Contractual Openness
Contrary to the archetypes described above, we also identified one archetype, which describes how contractual and relational governance become substitutes. Relational governance reduces the need for a complete contract.
The HR-OPS case covers two consecutive projects (Project1 and Project2) of a captive business process outsourcing between GLOBAL BANK and the vendor EPSILON. A comparison of these two projects demonstrates a further pattern of interaction resulting in the substitution of contractual governance in favour of relational governance.
Project1 was the first outsourcing project between GLOBAL BANK and EPSILON comprising HR back office services, such as benefits administration and overtime management. To uncover the substitution effect between contractual and relational governance an analysis of the contract crafting is necessary: The contract crafting had to adhere to a methodology called Captive Offshoring Methodology (COM). This methodology encompasses five successive phases, whereas the completion of each phase can be seen as a movement towards a higher degree of contractual completeness. In Project1 all phases were passed ranging from the filling out of "a lot of documentation" (C9), specification of preliminary requirements to the passage of detailed KPIs. Some months after the project went live, several interviewees expressed a high level of overall satisfaction with the project itself and notably explicitly emphasized their satisfaction on a relational level:
2 "I am satisfied with the project. Actually, very satisfied. I think it was very successful" (C10)
"The relationship is pretty good …. They [EPSILON] are highly committed to us." (C10) Given this in all respects successful relationship GLOBAL BANK decided to extend the scope of services and therefore initiated Project2 to hand over additional HR back office services . Comparing process of contract crafting for Project2 with Project1 a remarkable difference can be diagnosed: Instead of passing all five phases of the COM completely, some of the prescribed steps were omitted.
"In the case of Project2 … we didn't need to do it [one of the prescribed steps]" (V4).
But as each step of the COM aims at a higher level of contractual completeness, skipping a step implies a lower degree of contractual completeness. As demonstrated above Project1 has laid the foundation for relational governance and therefore this lower degree of contractual completeness can be interpreted as the outcome of a substitution of contractual governance in favour of relational governance. In other words: The relational norms and the commitment which have formed during the precursor project allow a higher degree of relational governance, which in turn allows less strict contractual stipulations for the subsequent project. Astonishing is the assessment of this lower degree of contractual completeness. Instead of complaining about a higher danger of opportunism, a GLOBAL BANK manager praises the higher level of flexibility received through the open contract:
"now it is much quicker to produce [an addendum to the contract] and if in future we wanted to add something slightly different or slightly a scope creep … it would probably fit in these two paragraphs and you wouldn´t have to change the [complete] contract." (C9)
Summing up, a well-attuned relational governance reduces the need for detailed and strict contractual stipulations. In this sense, relational governance substitutes for contractual governance. Moreover, our findings point to an underlying trade-off that explains occurrence of this substitutional effect. This is the trade-off between the need for flexibility (satisfied by a high degree of contractual openness) on the one hand and the need to safeguard against opportunism (satisfied with a high degree of contractual completeness) on the other hand (Maitland et al. 1985) . A deep relationship seems to devalue the importance of safeguarding and revalue the importance of flexibility and vice versa. Viewed in this light a high degree of relational governance amplifies contractual openness. Therefore, we call this archetype relational governance as amplifier for contractual openness.
Discussion
This study was motivated by the question of whether the relationship between contractual and relational governance is the outcome of distinct processes. Our analysis yielded four archetypical processes, which explain how the interplay between contractual and relational governance result in their complementarity or substitution (see table 2 for an overview of archetypical processes). Three of the identified processes explain a complementary, the fourth a substitutional relationship. Table 2 .
Overview of Archetypes
Archetypes A1, A2 and A3 share the characteristic that one type of governance mechanism is not simply the precursor for the opposing mechanism; rather, one governance mechanism establishes the basis for the other (complementarity). While sharing this characteristic, the three archetypes differ in their mode of operation: A1 explains how contractual clauses stipulate social interaction that fertilizes relational governance. A2 shows how strong social ties give access to knowledge which would otherwise be hard to collect and which is utilized to refine contractual clauses. The third archetype (A3) demonstrates how one mechanism (contractual governance) protects the application of the other one by reducing perceived relational risk. This is contrary to the fourth archetype (A4), in which relational governance does not take on a protective role when contractual governance is used. Instead, relational governance reduces the need for a strong contract.
Though there are slight overlaps, the archetypes demonstrate the essential differences that exist in the interaction between contractual and relational governance. Both A2 and A4 for instance, deal with the impact of relational governance on contractual completeness. However, the consequences of a wellattuned relational governance constitute the significant difference between both archetypes: While, in A2, well-attuned relational governance allows for a contract with a higher degree of contractual completeness (complementarity), the contrary is true for A4: A well-attuned relational governance reduces the desire for a complete contract. A1 and A3 also exhibit refined but important distinctions. Both archetypes explain how contractual governance enables relational governance (complementarity), but they differ in their mode of operation. That is, the contractual stipulation of social interaction results in the evolution of relational norms on the one hand (A1), and contractual governance that assumes the role of safety net that reduces perceived relational risk and enables relational governance to develop freely (A3), on the other.
Theoretical Implications
Our study offers a number of theoretical implications. First, our study facilitates a shift in perspective. While previous research characterized relational and contractual governance as either complements or substitutes (e.g., Poppo et al. 2002) , our findings explain the development of their relationship as the outcome of distinct processes. While our results indicate that the relationship between contractual and relational governance can still be classified as complementary or substitutional at a particular point in time, we argue that this relationship is far more complex. For one thing, this relationship does usually not last forever, but instead is subject to change over time. This extends previous findings by the notion that, as not only the degree of contractual and relational governance may change over time (Inkpen et al. 2004 ), but also their relationship. This is the result of a possible implication of our findings, i.e. that archetypical processes may emerge in a sequence. For example, contractual clauses might initially stipulate social interactions that fertilize relational governance (A1). Afterwards, contractual clauses might be refined by virtue of the sticky information gained by means of strong relational ties (A2). Later a follow-up project may be based on a more open contract precisely because the relationship has proven to be reliable (A4). Thus, contractual and relational governance may complement each other at an early point in time (A1, A2), but substitute for each other later (A4) , and vice versa.
While the limited number of cases in our study urges us to be careful about drawing conclusions, our study supports and also partially contradicts earlier findings. Most importantly it, provides insights, that question common beliefs on the relationship between contractual and relational governance. Our study contradicts both substitutional and complementary views as they advocate an exclusive relationship, meaning that contractual and relational governance are depicted as either substitutes or complements. We , on the other hand, observed complementarity as well as substitution over time. Besides this obvious implication, our study also questions and extends the underlying assumptions concerning the interplay of contractual and relational governance: So far, a substitutional view has depicted contractual governance as being solely part of an impersonal social structure. However, A1 reveals that contractual governance can very well stimulate interpersonal interaction. Hence, the separation of contractual and relational governance in the sense of a dualism seems to be more inappropriate.
The complementary view argues that contractual and relational governance are complements because they are two separate routes for accomplishing the same thing, i.e. they simultaneously but parallel to each other reduce complexity and absorb uncertainty (Reed 2001) . While the interplay between contractual and relational governance specified in A3 confirms this, A1 und A2 extend the complementary view by providing two additional rationales. First, contractual governance can enable relational governance by triggering the kind of social interaction required for relational norms to evolve. Second, relational governance possesses the capability to access sticky knowledge needed to refine contracts. Hence, both findings signify that relational and contractual governance are complements not only because they simultaneously but also parallel to each other reduce complexity, but because their differential capabilities interact with each other and hence reduce complexity in conjunction.
Finally, our findings might have the explanatory power to unify contradictory empirical results: While some researchers found evidence for a complementary relationship (e.g. Poppo et al. 2002) and others for a substitutional relationship (e.g. Ring et al. 1994) , this study highlights the importance of a dynamic perspective, as the very same types of governance mechanisms may be both complements and substitutes -at different points of time. Therefore, formerly contradictory empirical findings could be the result of neglecting the role of time.
Limitations and Implications for Future Research
There are several limitations to take into account. First, the study findings are based on a single-site, multiple-case study. This may influence the results, as there is a potential bias in the answers of the interview partners, e. g. based on the culture of the bank. Although a single-site case study enables a comparison of the cases analyzed, we are aware that generalization of our findings or the transferability to other outsourcing relationships should be empirically substantiated by future research. Hence, we call for replication studies that use multiple sites in different industries to test or extend the archetypes presented in this study. Moreover, as a second limitation, there is a potential bias towards the perspective of the client company, because in four of the five case studies the vendor is only represented by one interviewee. A third limitation, which should be subject to subsequent research efforts, are quantitative measures that are lacking. These should be developed to further investigate related effects caused by or in regard of different archetypes. Finally, our research focused on the identification of distinctive archetypes which lead to complementary or substitutional relationships. First indications suggest, that some archetypes emerge in a certain sequence. Hence, we suggest further research on patterns of interdependence between distinct archetypes. Furthermore, this study could be the starting point for a new approach to investigate the interplay of different governance mechanisms by analyzing the occurrence and changes of these relationships over time. The analysis would include the exploration of contingencies, which may trigger the four archetypical processes or sequences of archetypes.
